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Abstract 
This study explores the Italian unlisted companies’ earnings management practices. Adopting the earnings 
distribution approach and the logit analysis, it shows that, as in other countries where there is a close alignment 
between accounting and tax rules, fiscal incentives encourage companies with negative earnings to manage them 
upward to overcome the threshold of zero decreasing the probability of tax authorities’ investigations and those 
with positive earnings to manage them downward to bring them close to zero minimizing tax payments. As a 
result, they tend to report slightly positive earnings. The Italian unlisted companies’ earnings management 
practices are not limited by financial incentives, here intended in terms of levels of bank loans. Rather, 
companies with higher level of bank loans are more likely to manage earnings. This study contributes to better 
understand earnings management practices in unlisted companies and not English-speaking contexts that are 
little explored in literature. Moreover, it contributes to better understand the nature and consequences of the 
impacts of fiscal and financial incentives on earnings management practices. The findings should be beneficial to 
stakeholders and auditors of unlisted companies and tax authorities. 
Keywords: Earnings management, Earnings distribution approach, Avoidance of losses, Minimization of tax 
payments, Fiscal incentives, Financial incentives, Unlisted companies, Italy 
 
1. Introduction 
This study explores the Italian unlisted companies’ earnings management practices. In particular, it aims to verify 
their existence and to understand whether and how tax and financial incentives impact on them. 
The literature on earnings management practices is vast (e.g. Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Dechow, Ge and 
Scharand, 2010; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Schipper, 1989), but it is mainly focused on listed companies and on 
English-speaking contexts. This study, instead, explores unlisted companies and the Italian context. 
The case of the Italian unlisted companies is particularly fruitful for contributing to literature. 
With regard to tax incentives, previous studies have found that, especially in countries where there is a close 
alignment between accounting and tax rules, they encourage companies to manage earnings (e.g. Baralexis, 2004; 
Coppens and Peek, 2005; Eilifsen et al., 1999; Guenther, 1994; Hermann and Inoue, 1996; Marques et al., 2011; 
Othman and Zeghal, 2006). Italy can be included among these countries (Lamb, Nobes and Roberts, 1998). Thus, 
this study contributes to better understand the nature and consequences of the impact of fiscal incentives on 
earnings management practices. 
With regard to financial incentives, previous studies have explored whether and how the level of bank loans 
impacts on the earnings management practices induced by fiscal incentives (e.g. Baralexis, 2004; Moreira, 2006). 
They have come to conflicting conclusions. This study contributes to better understand the nature and 
consequences of the impact of financial incentives on earnings management practices. In doing so, it also 
responds to the Healy and Wahlen (1999)’s call for identifying factors that limit earnings management practices. 
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and develops the research hypothesis. 
Section 3 introduces the research design and the sample selection. Section 4 shows and discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 summarizes the main findings. 
 
2. Literature review and development of the hypothesis 
Previous studies have found that unlisted companies tend to report slightly positive earnings in countries (as Italy) 
where there is a close alignment between accounting and tax rules (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Marques et al., 
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2011). This is due to the impact of two tax incentives that work in opposite directions. Fiscal incentives 
encourage companies with positive earnings to manage them downward to bring them close to zero minimizing 
tax payments, on the one hand, and those with negative earnings to manage them upward to overcome the 
threshold of zero decreasing the probability of tax authorities’ investigations, on the other hand. As a result, they 
tend to report slightly positive earnings. 
Such studies have explored the existence of earnings management practices by analysing the frequency 
distributions of earnings. This is the so-called earnings distribution approach. It is based on the idea that, in the 
absence of earnings management practices, earnings are distributed in a regular way, namely without 
discontinuity. It is expected that the number of companies that achieve results lower than a given level to a 
certain extent and the number of companies that achieve results higher than that given level to the same extent 
are not significantly different. As a result, it follows that the occurrence of discontinuity around that given level 
is a signal of earnings management practices. 
The frequency distribution of earnings of the companies that manage earnings upward to avoid losses presents a 
discontinuity between the first negative interval to the left of zero and the first positive interval to the right of 
zero (e.g. Baber and Kang, 2002; Beatty, Ke and Petroni, 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2004; Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Collins, Pincus and Xie, 1999; Coppens and Peek, 2005; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999; 
Easton, 1999; Hamdi and Zarai, 2012; Hayn, 1995; Holland and Ramsay, 2003; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; 
Kerstein and Rai, 2007; Marques et al., 2011; Phillips et al., 2004; Revsine et al., 2009). This is the so-called 
discontinuity around zero. That of the companies that manage earnings downward to minimize tax payments 
presents a discontinuity between the first positive interval and the second positive interval to the right of zero 
(e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Marques et al., 2011). Although the presence of discontinuities has been widely 
interpreted as evidence of earnings management practices, some studies have challenged this interpretation (e.g. 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson, 2007; Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003; Durtschi and Easton, 2005; 
Durtschi and Easton, 2009; Holland, 2004). 
To test whether fiscal incentives impact on the Italian unlisted companies’ earnings management practices, as in 
previous studies, the two following null hypothesis are tested: 
H1: The frequency of the first negative interval to the left of zero is equal to the frequency of the first positive 
interval to the right of zero. 
H2: The frequency of the first positive interval to the right of zero is equal to the frequency of the second positive 
interval to the right of zero. 
Previous studies have found that companies with higher actual tax rates are more likely to manage earnings 
downward to minimize tax payments than companies with lower actual tax rates (e.g. Goncharov and 
Zimmermann, 2006; Marques et al., 2011). 
Italian unlisted companies usually have actual tax rates (defined as the ratios between income taxes and income 
before taxes) that differ from the nominal tax rate (established by law and equal for all companies). This happens 
because the rules for the determination of costs and revenues for tax and accounting purposes differ. Italian 
unlisted companies usually have the fiscal tax base that diverges (and is generally higher) from the accounting 
tax base (resulting from financial statements). The determination of the fiscal tax base depends on the accounting 
tax base to which it is necessary to make a series of increases and decreases in order to take into account the 
different rules for the determination of costs and revenues according to fiscal and accounting rules. As a result, 
the actual tax rates differ from the nominal tax rate and can vary from company to company. 
To test whether the level of actual tax rates has an impact on the Italian unlisted companies’ propencity to 
manage earnings, as in previous studies, the following null hypothesis is tested: 
H3: Companies with higher actual tax rates are no more likely to manage earnings downward than companies 
with lower actual tax rates. 
Moreira (2006) has explored the impact of the levels of bank loans on the Portuguese unlisted companies’ 
earnings management practices. He has found that companies with higher level of bank loans have a higher 
propencity to manage earnings upward to avoid losses and a lower propencity to manage earnings downward to 
minimize tax payments than companies with lower levels of bank loans. He has suggested that “the probability 
of obtaining the necessary funds at a reasonable cost is positively related to the quality of their accounting 
numbers, given that bank’s credit decisions are based on firms’ financial information. Thus, this […] incentive 
tends to motivate firms into adopting accounting choices that provoke an impact on reported earnings in the 
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opposite sense to that related taxes”. It is like if the bank system acts as a controller of earnings management 
practices of Portuguese unlisted companies. 
On the contrary, Baralexis (2004) has found that the same incentive does not work in the Greek context. So, 
banks require (informal) information additional to those reported in financial statements to grant loans to Greek 
companies. 
To test whether the level of bank loans has an impact on the Italian unlisted companies’ propencity to manage 
earnings, the following null hypothesis is tested: 
H4: Companies with higher levels of bank loans are no more likely to manage earnings than companies with 
lower levels of bank loans. 
 
3. Research design and sample selection 
3.1 The earnings distribution approach 
To test research hypothesis, the earnings distribution approach is used (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). It is 
particularly useful when, as in this study, the research aim is to detect the frequency of earnings management 
practices since it identifies the context in which a large number of companies appears to have managed earnings 
(e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Sun and Rath, 2010). 
The earnings distribution approach is based on the hypothesis that companies usually have great incentives to 
achieve certain earnings levels (earnings thresholds). Thus, the frequency distribution of earnings shows fewer 
observations than expected just below the earnings threshold and more observations than expected just above the 
earnings threshold. The discontinuity in the frequency distribution of earnings is the evidence of earnings 
management practices. 
To explore the frequency distribution of earnings and to identify the presence of discontinuities, the graphical 
analysis method is used (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). It consists in the analysis of the graphical representation 
of the frequency distribution of earnings (usually an histogram). The abscissa axis shows earnings intervals. The 
ordinate axis shows frequencies, namely the numbers of the observations that fall in each earnings interval. 
The earnings and the interval amplitude that should be used in the graphical representation are critical and 
debated issues because both of them may impact on the results of the graphical analysis method (e.g. Durtschi 
and Easton, 2005; Durtschi and Easton, 2009; Holland, 2004). 
With reference to earnings, according to Burstahler and Dichev (1997), they are defined as follows: 
1-it
it
it TA
NE
=E            (1) 
where: Eit is the earnings reported by the company i in the financial year t; NEit is the net income reported by the 
company i in the financial year t; TAit-1 is the total assets of the company i in the financial year t-1. 
With reference to the interval amplitude, according to Silverman (1986), it is defined as follows: 
5
1
N×IQ×79.0=A           (2) 
where: A is the interval amplitude; IQ is the inter-quartile range, namely the difference between the third and the 
first quartile of the earnings distribution; N is the total number of observations. 
Applying such a method, the interval amplitude is 0.0025. So, the interval that will be marked with “1” is the 
first positive interval to the right of zero [0; 0.0025), the interval that will be marked with “2” is the second 
positive interval to the right of zero [0.0025; 0.0050), and so on.Conversely, the interval that will be marked with 
“-1” is the first negative interval to the left of zero [-0.0025; 0), the interval that will be marked with “-2” is the 
second negative interval to the left of zero [-0.0050; -0.0025), and so on. Each figure will truncated. They will 
show only the first thirty intervals of positive earnings (to the right of zero, from 1 to 30) and the first thirty 
intervals of negative earnings (to the left of zero, from -1 to -30). Earnings intervals are closed at the lower limit 
and opened at the higher limit, meaning that the interval includes the lower limit and excludes the upper limit, as 
marked by the use of square and round brackets respectively. The observations with net income exactly equal to 
zero (that are 99) have been excluded. 
This study shows the results referring to the interval amplitude of 0.0025. However, the investigation has been 
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repeated using different interval amplitudes (e.g. Scott, 1979; Silverman, 1986) obtaining results that are 
qualitatively similar to those that are shown. 
To estimate the statistical significance of the discontinuities that may emerge in the frequency distribution of 
earnings, the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)’s test statistics is used. It is defined as follows: 
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where: Zi is the statistic test, referring to interval i, with approximately normal distribution (with mean zero and 
standard deviation one); nai is the actual number of observations that fall in the interval i; nei is the expected 
number of observations that fall in the interval i; σi is the standard deviation of the differences between the actual 
and the expected numbers of observation that fall in the interval i; ni is the actual number of observations that fall 
in the interval i; N is the total number of observations; pi is the portion of actual observations that fall in the 
interval i. 
The test statistics is based on the assumption that the frequency distribution of earnings levels is smooth under 
the null hypothesis of no earnings management practices. It is smooth if the expected number of observations 
that fall in an interval of the frequency distribution of earnings is the average of the number of observations that 
fall in the two immediately adjacent intervals. 
Garrod et al. (2006) report that the test statistic is not significantly affected by the choice regarding to earnings 
intervals.1 
To test Hypothesis 3, the overall sample is divided into two sub-samples on the basis of the level of the actual tax 
rate. The first sub-sample consists of the observations for which the corresponding actual tax rate is higher than 
the median of the overall observations. The second sub-sample consists of the observations for which the 
corresponding actual tax rate is lower than the median of the overall observations. 
The actual tax rate is defined as follows: 
it
itit
it IBT
NI-IBT
=ATR           (4) 
where: ATRit is the actual tax rate of the company i referring to the financial year t; IBTit is the income before 
taxes of the company i referring to the financial year t; NIit is the net income of the company i referring to the 
financial year t. 
To test Hypothesis 4, instead, the overall sample is divided into two sub-samples on the basis of the level of the 
bank loans. The first sub-sample consists of the observations for which the corresponding bank loans are higher 
than the median of the overall observations. The second sub-sample consists of the observations for which the 
corresponding bank loans are lower than the median of the overall observations. 
The level of bank loans is defined as follows: 
it
it
it TA
BANKLOANS
=BL           (5) 
where: BLit is the level of bank loans of the company i referring to the financial year t; BANKLOANSit is the 
bank loans of the company i referring to the financial year t; TAit is the total assets of the company i referring to 
the financial year t. 
To test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, the frequency distributions of earnings and the pervasiveness of earnings 
management practices of the two sub-samples are compared. They will not be different if the behaviours of the 
                                                 
1
 To discuss irregularities (such as discontinuities) in a distribution, it is necessary to refer to a benchmark distribution that can be considered 
regular. Comparing an empirical distribution with the expected (or theoretical) distribution allows researchers to reveal differences that can 
be interpreted as irregularities. As known, it is not possible to observe the frequency distribution of unmanaged earnings. Thus, the 
benchmark distribution is unknown. In the current study, the approach used to explore irregularities is that resulting to be the dominant one in 
the accounting literature (e.g. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson, 2007; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Brown, 2001; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006; Coppens and Peek, 2005; Das and Zhang, 2003; Daske, Gebhardt and 
McLeay, 2006; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999; Glaum, Lichtblau and Lindemann, 2004; Holland and Ramsey, 2003; Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki, 2003; McNichols, 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006). In this approach, whatever law is applied, it is assumed that the frequency 
distribution of earnings is smooth if earnings are unmanaged. 
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two sub-samples relating to a certain incentive do not differ. 
The pervasiveness of earnings management practices is measured through the Moreira (2006)’s degree of 
pervasiveness that is defined as follows: 
i
ii
i ne
na-ne
=pp            (6) 
where: ppi is the degree of pervasiveness referring to the interval i; nei is the expected number of observations 
that fall in the interval i; nai is the actual number of observations that fall in the interval i. 
The degree of pervasiveness is based on the hypothesis that the higher the difference between the expected and 
actual observations falling in a given earnings interval, the higher the pervasiveness of earnings management 
practices. 
3.2 The logit analysis 
To statistically confirm the results obtained adopting the previous research method, a logit analysis model is used. 
The logit analysis aims to assess whether and how the dependent (explanatory) variables affect the probability 
that an observation assumes a specific attribute of the dichotomy dependent variable (e.g. Cramer, 2003). 
The model, that is very parsimonious, focusing on the essential features of the hypothesis being tested, is: 
itit3it2it10it ε+TAlnβ+lBLβ+lATRβ+β=EM        (7) 
where: EMit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation i falls in the first positive interval to the 
right of zero (interval 1), 0 otherwise; lATRit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the ATR corresponding to 
the observation i is higher than the median of the overall distribution, 0 otherwise; lBLit is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if the BL corresponding to the observation i is lower than the median of the overall distribution, 0 
otherwise; lnTAit is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the financial year t corresponding to the 
observation i; єit is the disturbance term; i and t are company and year indexes, respectively. 
According to previous studies (e.g. Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006; Marques et al., 2011), it is expected that 
the coefficient of the variable lATR will be positive (β1>0). If the level of the ATR has a positive impact on the 
propensity of companies in practising earnings management, the higher the actual tax rate, the higher the 
probability that observations fall in the first positive interval to the right of zero.  
According to previous studies (e.g. Moreira, 2006), it is expected that the coefficient of the variable lBL will be 
negative (β2>0). If the level of BL has a negative impact on the propensity of the companies in practising 
earnings management, the higher the BL, the lower the probability that observations fall in the first positive 
interval to the right of zero. 
With reference to the variable lnTA, no prediction about its sign is made. 
3.3 Sample selection and data 
The sample of the Italian unlisted companies used to test the research hypothesis has been taken (on 18th June 
2013) from the AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk. The sample has been selected on the basis of the selection 
criteria below: companies that have the legal form of “company limited by share”; unlisted companies; active 
companies; companies that prepare (not consolidated) financial statement adopting the national accounting 
standards; companies operating in sectors different from the financial one; companies with the financial 
statement available in the database for each year in the period 2003-2011; companies with bank loans; 
companies for which all the necessary data are available. On the basis of the listed criteria, the sample includes a 
total of 90,594 observations. 
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics referring to the sample. They highlight some important features of 
Italian unlisted companies. Those that are important for the aims of this study refer to the levels of the actual tax 
rates and the levels of the bank loans. On average, both of them are high. With reference to the dimensional level, 
considering the Italian context, the sample mainly includes medium-large companies. Compared to other 
contexts, however, they can appear small. 
4. Results and discussion 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distributions of earnings of the Italian unlisted companies included in the overall 
sample. It highlights two discontinuities. The first one is between the interval -1 and the interval 1. It is the so-
called discontinuity around zero. The second one is between the interval 1 and the interval 2. 
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The values assumed by the statistics Z, showed in Table 2, confirm the statistical significance of the two 
discontinuities. In fact: the interval -1 is significantly under-represented (Z
-1=-70.50; p-value<0.0001); the 
interval 1 is significantly over-represented (Z1=60.22; p-value<0.0001); the interval 2 is significantly under-
represented (Z2=-11.02; p-value<0.0001). 
The frequency distribution of earnings should be approximately smooth in the absence of earnings management 
practices (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Instead, it emerges an abnormally low frequency of slightly negative 
earnings (those that fall in the interval -1) and an abnormally high frequency of slightly positive earnings (those 
that fall in the interval 1) that are consistent with the presence of earnings management to avoid losses (e.g. 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Thus, Italian unlisted companies with negative earnings manage earnings upward 
to make them slightly positive to avoid losses. Moreover, it emerges an abnormally high frequency of 
observations in the interval 1 and an abnormally low frequency of observations in the interval 2 that are 
consistent with the presence of earnings management to minimize tax payments (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; 
Marques et al., 2011). Thus, Italian unlisted companies with positive earnings manage earnings downward to 
make them slightly positive to minimize tax payments. As a result, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are rejected. 
To test whether the level of ATR impacts on the Italian unlisted companies’ earning management practices 
(Hypothesis 3), the overall sample is divided into two sub-samples, consisting of the observations for which the 
corresponding ATR is higher (HATR) or lower (LATR) than the median of the overall observations respectively. 
The HATR frequency distribution of earnings (Figure 2) presents (1) a discontinuity around zero, (2) another 
discontinuity between the interval 1 and the interval 2, (3) a peak of observations in the interval 1, (4) a trend 
that is convex to the left of zero and concave to the right of zero. 
The values assumed by the statistics Z (Table 3) confirm the statistical significance of the discontinuities. In fact: 
the interval -1 is significantly under-represented (Z
-1=-72.74; p-value<0.0001); the interval 1 is significantly 
over-represented (Z1=65.06; p-value<0.0001); the interval 2 is significantly under-represented (Z2=-12.55; p-va-
lue<0.0001). 
In general, the HATR frequency distribution of earnings has all the features of the case in which fiscal incentives 
encourage earnings management practices (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006; 
Marques et al., 2011). The HATR companies with negative earnings manage earnings upward to make them 
slightly positive to avoid losses and those with positive earnings manage earnings downward to make them 
slightly positive to minimize tax payments.  
The LATR frequency distribution of earnings (Figure 2) presents (1) a discontinuity around zero, (2) no 
discontinuity between the interval 1 and the interval 2, (3) no peak of observations in the interval 1 (the interval 
of earnings to which corresponds the higher frequency of observations is one of the positive intervals to the right 
of zero following the first one), (4) a trend that is convex both to the left and to the right of zero. 
The values assumed by the statistics Z (Table 4) confirm the statistical significance of the discontinuity. In fact: 
the interval -1 is significantly under-represented (Z
-1=-13.20; p-value<0.0001); the interval 1 is significantly 
over-represented (Z1=2.29; p-value<0.0001). The interval 2 does not have a statistically significant difference 
between the expected and the actual numbers of observations. 
In general, the LATR frequency distribution of earnings has all the features of the case in which fiscal incentives 
do not encourage earnings management practices (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Goncharov and Zimmermann, 
2006; Marques et al., 2011). The LATR companies with negative earnings manage earnings upward to make 
them positive and to avoid losses and, unlike the HATR sub-sample, those with positive earnings do not manage 
earnings downward to make them slightly positive to minimize tax payments. 
The frequency distributions of earnings of two sub-samples will not be different if the behaviours of such two 
sub-samples relating to certain incentives do not differ. Instead, it emerges that they are different. In addition, the 
pervasiveness of earnings management practices differs between the two sub-samples, as shown by the indexes 
of pervasiveness (pp) reported in Table 3. Their values, referring to the earnings intervals of interest (-1, 1 and 2), 
are always higher in the HATR sub-sample than in the LATR sub-sample. 
The HATR companies are more likely to manage earnings than LATR companies. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
To test whether the level of BL impacts on the Italian unlisted companies’ earning management practices 
(Hypothesis 4), the overall sample is divided into two sub-samples, consisting of the observations for which the 
corresponding BL is higher (HBL) or lower (LBL) than the median of the overall observations respectively. 
Both the frequency distributions of earnings (Figure 3) present (1) a discontinuity around zero, (2) another 
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discontinuity between the interval 1 and the interval 2, (3) a peak of observations in the interval 1, (4) a trend 
that is convex to the left of zero and concave to the right of zero. 
The values assumed by the statistics Z (Table 4) confirm the statistical significance of the discontinuities. With 
reference to the HBL sub-sample, the interval -1 is significantly under-represented (Z
-1=-59.85; p-value<0.0001), 
the interval 1 is significantly over-represented (Z1=51.12; p-value<0.0001), the interval 2 is significantly under-
represented (Z2=-9.96; p-value<0.0001). With reference to the LBL sub-sample, interval -1 is significantly 
under-represented (Z
-1=-38.54; p-value<0.0001); the interval 1 is significantly over-represented (Z1=32.86; p-va-
lue<0.0001); the interval 2 is significantly under-represented (Z2=-5.27; p-value<0.0001). 
In general, both the frequency distributions of earnings have all the features of the case in which fiscal incentives 
encourage earnings management practices (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006; 
Marques et al., 2011). With reference to both the sub-sample, the companies with negative earnings manage 
earnings upward to make them slightly positive to avoid losses and those with positive earnings manage earnings 
downward to make them slightly positive to minimize tax payments. 
However, the pervasiveness of earnings management practices differs between the two sub-samples, as shown by 
the indexes of pervasiveness (pp) reported in Table 4. Their values, referring to the earnings intervals of interest 
(-1, 1 and 2), are always higher in the HBL sub-sample than in the LBL sub-sample. 
The HBL companies are more likely to manage earnings than LBL companies. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
The previous findings are partially in contrast with those of Moreira (2006). He has also found that Portuguese 
unlisted companies with higher levels of bank loans manage earnings upward to avoid losses in a more pervasive 
way than those with lower levels of bank loans. He, instead, has found that Portuguese unlisted companies with 
higher levels of bank loans do not manage earnings downward to minimize tax payments in a more pervasive 
way than those with lower levels of bank loans. He has found that Portuguese unlisted companies with higher 
levels of bank loans tend to avoid losses and to target earnings to intervals not close to zero. Thus, financial 
incentives limit Portuguese unlisted companies’ practices to manage earnings downward to minimize tax 
payments. This does not happen in the Italian context. 
The logit analysis, based on the model described above, statistically confirm what has just emerged from the 
previous analysis. Table 5 shows its results. 
The coefficient of the variable lATR (β1) is positive, as expected. This means that the HATR observations have a 
higher probability of falling in the interval 1 than the LATR observations. 
The coefficient of the variable lBL (β2) is positive, differently from what is expected. This means that the HBL 
observations have a higher probability of falling in the interval 1 than the LBL observations. 
The values of the two coefficients are consistent with the results of the previous analysis. 
The coefficient of the variable lnTA (β3) is positive. This means that the higher the total assets, the higher the 
probability of falling in the interval 1. 
All the estimated coefficients are statistically significant (p-value 0.0001). The goodness-of-fit test indicates 
that the model fits the data very well. 
5. Conclusion 
Adopting the earnings distribution approach, this study has shown that Italian unlisted companies are likely to 
practice earnings management. Those companies with positive earnings manage them downward to bring them 
close to zero minimizing tax payments. Those companies with negative earnings manage them upward to 
overcome the threshold of zero decreasing the probability of tax authorities’ investigations. As a result, they tend 
to report slightly positive earnings. According to previous studies (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Marques et al., 
2011), this is consistent with the presence of fiscal incentives. 
The impact of fiscal incentives has been confirmed by the fact that earnings management practices aiming to 
bring earnings close to zero is observable among the companies that have higher ATR and not among the 
companies that have lower ATR (e.g. Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2006; Marques et al., 2011). 
These findings confirm those of previous studies (e.g. Coppens and Peek, 2005; Goncharov and Zimmermann, 
2006; Marques et al., 2011). In countries (as Italy) where there is a close alignment between accounting and tax 
rules, fiscal incentives have a great impact on unlisted companies’ earnings management practices. 
This study, moreover, has shown that the Italian unlisted companies’ earnings management practices are not 
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limited by financial incentives, intended in terms of levels of bank loans. Rather, companies with higher BL are 
more likely to manage earnings than companies with lower BL. This is different from what happens in the 
Portuguese context (Moreira, 2006). This can explain why Italian banks does not give a great importance to the 
financial information provided by the Italian unlisted companies’ financial statements and, as a result, why they 
require (informal) information additional to those reported in financial statements to grant loans to Italian 
companies. 
An important implication of the findings of this study is that the Italian unlisted companies’ earnings are not 
unconditionally informative about their performance. As a result, earnings should be interpreted with caution by 
those who use the financial statements’ information. The findings should be beneficial to stakeholders and 
auditors of unlisted companies and tax authorities. 
This study contributes to better understand earnings management practices in unlisted companies and not 
English-speaking contexts that are little explored in literature. Moreover, it contributes to better understand the 
nature and consequences of the impacts of fiscal and financial incentives on earnings management practices. 
This study does not show neither the magnitude of earnings management nor the specific methods used to 
manage earnings in the Italian context. This depends on the disadvantages of the earnings distribution approach 
(e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Yu et al., 2006). Therefore, further study are needed for a more complete 
understanding of the Italian unlisted companies’ earnings management practices. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 total 
Observations 11.052 11.251 11.275 11.416 11.336 11.277 11.185 11.802 90.594 
Observations in positive intervals   7,893     8,364     7,457     8,346     9,179     8,964     8,819     9,390   68,412  
    71.42% 74.34% 66.14% 73.11% 80.97% 79.49% 78.85% 79.56% 75.51% 
Observations in interval 1    1,413     1,323     1,266     1,235     1,187     1,371     1,337     1,344   10,476  
    12.79% 11.76% 11.23% 10.82% 10.47% 12.16% 11.95% 11.39% 11.56% 
E:                   
  Mean 0.0086 0.0133 0.0064 0.0153 0.0220 0.0193 0.0177 0.0205 0.0154 
  standard deviation 0.0513 0.0463 0.0466 0.0502 0.0429 0.0422 0.0417 0.0469 0.0464 
  first quartile -0.0038 -0.0002 -0.0100 -0.0021 0.0015 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0002 
  second quartile (median) 0.0054 0.0073 0.0042 0.0076 0.0118 0.0095 0.0093 0.0103 0.0080 
  third quartile 0.0271 0.0299 0.0234 0.0325 0.0383 0.0331 0.0321 0.0356 0.0315 
ATR:                   
  mean 0.5881 0.5427 0.5462 0.6168 0.6434 0.7678 0.7127 0.7068 0.6410 
  standard deviation 0.8246 0.6788 0.7944 0.8382 0.7533 0.9625 0.7969 0.8175 0.8155 
  first quartile 0.3107 0.2931 0.2181 0.3287 0.4024 0.4476 0.4295 0.4166 0.3557 
  second quartile (median) 0.4520 0.4324 0.4235 0.4604 0.5234 0.5994 0.5745 0.5653 0.5094 
  third quartile 0.7217 0.6827 0.6783 0.7248 0.7506 0.8394 0.8169 0.8108 0.7619 
BL:                   
  mean 0.2512 0.2466 0.2459 0.2489 0.2585 0.2478 0.2412 0.2394 0.2474 
  standard deviation 0.1704 0.1668 0.1686 0.1688 0.1737 0.1681 0.1646 0.1646 0.1683 
  first quartile 0.1045 0.1027 0.0984 0.1001 0.1073 0.1033 0.0973 0.0974 0.1012 
  second quartile (median) 0.2439 0.2393 0.2370 0.2395 0.2493 0.2379 0.2300 0.2277 0.2379 
  third quartile 0.3799 0.3728 0.3739 0.3787 0.3921 0.3764 0.3644 0.3624 0.3755 
TA (/1.000):                   
  mean 39,562 39,063 37,293 37,665 34,089 32,314 30,271 27,066 34,616 
  standard deviation 62,398 62,289 59,917 59,920 54,209 51,083 48,936 43,709 55,777 
  first quartile 10,872 10,726 10,071 10,177 9,319 8,766 8,124 7,161 9,254 
  second quartile (median) 19,407 19,124 17,980 18,239 16,237 15,380 14,134 12,641 16,486 
  third quartile 39,825 39,597 37,413 37,973 34,342 32,408 29,881 26,606 34,762 
A few observations take on extreme values. So all the descriptive statistics shown in the table are calculated after 
eliminating the upper and the lower 1% of the observations for each year. 
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Table 2. Statistics Zi referring to the overall sample 
 Earnings intervals 
 -2 -1 1 2 
nai 1.774 1.564 10.476 6.678 
nei 1.627 6.125 4.121 7.747 
σi 50.23 64.69 105.53 96.94 
Zi 2.93 -70.50 60.22 -11.02 
p-value (two-tiled) 0.0034 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Table 3. Statistics Zi and ppi referring to the HATR and LATR sub-samples 
 Earnings intervals 
 -2 -1 1 2 
 HATR LATR HATR LATR HATR LATR HATR LATR 
nai 1.609 165 1.467 97 10.032 444 6.002 676 
nei 1.441 187 5.821 305 3.735 387 7.099 648 
σi 47.18 16.03 59.85 15.72 96.80 25.09 87.43 31.31 
Zi 3.57 -1.34 -72.74 -13.20 65.06 2.29 -12.55 0.91 
p-value (two-tiled) 0.0004 0.1802 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0220 <0.0001 0.3628 
ppi 0.1166 0.1176 0.7480 0.6820 1.6859 0.1473 0.1545 0.0432 
 
Table 4. Statistics Zi and ppi referring to the HBL and LBL sub-samples 
 Earnings intervals 
 -2 -1 1 2 
 HBL LBL HBL LBL HBL LBL HBL LBL 
nai 1.066 708 912 652 6.757 3.719 4.129 2.549 
nei 978 649 3.912 2.214 2.521 1.601 4.879 2.868 
σi 38.84 31.81 50.12 40.51 82.88 64.48 75.28 60.48 
Zi 2.27 1.85 -59.85 -38.54 51.12 32.86 -9.96 -5.27 
p-value (two-tiled) 0.0232 0.0643 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
ppi 0.0900 0.0909 0.7669 0.7055 1.6803 1.3229 0.1537 0.1112 
 
Table 5. The logit analysis results 
Independent variables Predicted sign Estimated coefficients p-value 
lATR + +3.37363*** <0.0000 
lBL - +0.42857*** <0.0000 
lnTA (?) +0.14756*** <0.0000 
 
χ2 (goodness-of-fit test) 12.559.9 <0.0000 
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Figure 1. Italian unlisted companies’ earnings distribution (overall sample) 
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Figure 2. Italian unlisted companies’ earnings distribution (sub-samples obtaining dividing the overall sample on 
the basis of the level of ATR) 
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Figure 3. Italian unlisted companies’ earnings distribution (sub-samples obtaining dividing the overall sample on 
the basis of the level of BL) 
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